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An informed citizenry is vital to the functioning of a democratic society.1
I. INTRODUCTION
 The Community Reinvestment Act (“CRA”) was born of noble ideals and strong 
convictions, but like most legislation the end result was far from perfect.  Nevertheless, 
the CRA brought attention to the practice of “redlining,” a practice by which banks 
refuse to lend to predominantly minority and/or low-income neighborhoods.  It also 
increased the monitoring and regulation of bank lending practices.2  Since its passage 
in 1977, however, the banking and lending landscape has dramatically changed—
making the CRA an anachronism that does not adequately protect communities.3
 Attorneys and community groups have therefore developed new strategies 
through the use of the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) to make the CRA 
work the way it was intended—to protect communities from unscrupulous banking 
practices.4  However, in Inner City Press v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, the Second Circuit shed new light on an old rule that could severely limit the 
information available to community economic development advocates through FOIA 
requests.5  The Second Circuit based its holding on an interpretation of a FOIA ex-
emption set forth by the D.C. Circuit Court in Critical Mass Energy Project v. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission.6  Although the Second Circuit did not expressly adopt the 
Critical Mass rule, it all but invited the argument for full adoption of the rule in fu-
ture cases regarding FOIA requests for CRA information.7
1. NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242 (1978) (alteration of original).
2. See generally Peter P. Swire, The Persistent Problem of Lending Discrimination: A Law and Economics 
Analysis, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 787, 802–05 (1995) (discussing the various racially discriminatory practices of 
lending institutions and the legislation that has been enacted over time to combat these practices).
3. See 12 U.S.C. § 2902(2) (2006) (defining the scope of the CRA regulations as applying to “insured 
depository institution[s]” but not to lenders who do not provide depository services) (emphasis added). 
See generally Allen N. Berger, Anil K. Kashyap & Joseph M. Scalise, The Transformation of the U.S. 
Banking Industry: What a Long, Strange Trip It’s Been (Wharton Sch. Ctr. for Fin. Inst., Working Paper 
No. 96-06, 1995) (analyzing the dramatic changes in the U.S. commercial banking industry over the 
last fifteen years); Anthony D. Taibi, Banking, Finance, and Community Economic Empowerment: 
Structural Economic Theory, Procedural Civil Rights, and Substantive Racial Justice, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 
1463, 1466 (1994) (finding that “[t]he ongoing consolidation of the banking industry has had and will 
continue to have a profound negative impact in low- and moderate-income communities and in non-
White communities”).
4. See Richard D. Marsico, Democratizing Capital: The History, Law, and Reform of the 
Community Reinvestment Act 12–15 (2005) (noting that Congress passed the CRA to put an end 
to two banking practices—redlining and capital export—which were highly destructive of urban and 
minority neighborhoods).
5. 463 F.3d 239 (2d Cir. 2006).
6. 975 F.2d 871 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
7. See Inner City Press, 463 F.3d at 245 n.6 (“We have not previously adopted the Critical Mass amendment 
to the National Parks test.  The parties here do not argue for its adoption and the district court did not 
apply it in its decision.  We decline to adopt nostra sponte the Critical Mass test.”) (citation omitted). 
However, for all intents and purposes, the court took a step toward adopting Critical Mass in holding 
that an “agency must both possess and exercise the legal authority to obtain information for the result-
ing submission of information to be deemed ‘mandatory’ under the National Parks test.”  Id. at 248.  The 
National Parks test, referred to by the court, had traditionally been the test used in FOIA exemption 4 
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 This note contends that the Second Circuit’s adoption of the Critical Mass rule, 
in the context of FOIA requests for CRA information, would substantially impair 
the efficacy of the CRA and eliminate a valuable tool in the community advocate’s 
fight to protect New York communities from predatory lending practices.  Part II of 
this note outlines the history and purpose of the CRA.  Part III provides a brief 
overview of the securitization of subprime loans and the role banks play in this pro-
cess, and argues that a bank’s role in the securitization process is essential information 
in determining a bank’s CRA performance.  Part IV explains the use of FOIA re-
quests to obtain information regarding a bank’s lending and investment practices. 
Part V examines how banks use the confidentiality exception of FOIA to resist pro-
viding information on their lending practices.  Finally, Part VI argues that the 
Critical Mass rule contradicts the purposes of the CRA and FOIA and argues that 
adoption of this rule in the Second Circuit would mark a dangerous step backward at 
a time when there is a stronger need for greater transparency and accountability 
among communities, regulators, and financial institutions.8
II. HISTORY & PURPOSE OF THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT
 The primary purpose of the Community Reinvestment Act was to combat a 
banking practice that was commonly referred to as “redlining” and to reverse a 
growing trend of “exporting capital” out of low- and moderate-income communi-
ties.9  Redlining is a practice by which banks would take out a map and literally draw 
a red line around certain neighborhoods (largely low-income and minority neighbor-
hoods) and “refuse[] to lend there because of perceived credit risks associated with 
the neighborhood.”10  Hence, it became known as a predatory refusal to lend.  Even 
though many redlined neighborhoods were creditworthy, they were nevertheless ab-
cases, until the D.C. Circuit’s holding in Critical Mass.  The National Parks test and the inf luence of 
Critical Mass will be discussed infra in Part V of this note.
8. See, e.g., Michael M. Grynbaum, Obama Urges Wall Street to Protect the Middle Class, N.Y. Times, Sept. 
18, 2007, at A25 (calling for more transparency in the financial industry, specifically in the housing 
market and arguing that federal laws are needed to prevent mortgage fraud); Arthur Levitt, Jr., Conflicts 
and the Credit Crunch, Wall St. J., Sept. 7, 2007, at A15 (comparing the subprime mortgage crisis to 
the Enron-era scandals and noting that they share the same root causes: lack of accountability and little 
transparency).  See generally Keith R. Fisher, Toward a Basal Tenth Amendment: A Riposte to National 
Bank Preemption of State Consumer Protection Laws, 29 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 981 (2006) (discussing 
banks’ use of affiliates or contractual relationships to use predatory lending tactics in the context of 
usurping state consumer protection laws through federal preemption—a different yet analogous sce-
nario).
9. Marsico, supra note 4, at 12.
10. Id.; see also Swire, supra note 2, at 800–01 (“The lasting damage done by the national government was 
that it put its seal of approval on ethnic and racial discrimination and developed policies which had the 
result of the practical abandonment of large sections of older, industrial cities.  More seriously, 
Washington actions were later picked up by private interests, so that banks and savings-and-loan insti-
tutions institutionalized the practice of denying mortgages ‘solely because of the geographical location 
of the property.’”).
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solutely cut off from access to loans.11  Moreover, banks would take the deposits from 
these communities and “export” that capital to originate loans in other areas—largely 
suburban, middle- and upper-income neighborhoods.12  This pattern of redlining 
and exporting capital effectively disenfranchised entire neighborhoods by eliminating 
opportunities to build credit—credit that could have helped to build equity in a 
home, to start a small business, or to send a child to college.13
 The CRA provides that the appropriate federal agency must use its power to 
thoroughly examine a bank’s record of meeting community credit needs.14  In en-
acting the CRA, Congress set forth its findings and purposes in language that was 
noticeably vague:
The Congress finds that—
 (1) regulated financial institutions are required by law to demonstrate   
 that their deposit facilities serve the convenience and needs of the   
 communities in which they are chartered to do business;
11. 123 Cong. Rec. 17,630 (1977).  More than a decade after the passage of the CRA, studies continued to 
show pervasive discriminatory lending practices based on race.  Alicia H. Munnell et al., Mortgage 
Lending in Boston: Interpreting HMDA Data 1 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Boston, Working Paper No. 92-7, 
1992).  “The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data for 1990 . . . showed substantially higher 
denial rates for black and Hispanic applicants than for white applicants.  These minorities were two to 
three times as likely to be denied mortgage loans as whites.  In fact, high-income minorities in Boston 
were more likely to be turned down than low-income whites.”  Id.  Presently, thirty years after the pas-
sage of the CRA, racial discrimination in home mortgage lending persists.  Richard D. Marsico, 
N.Y. Law Sch. Econ. Justice Project, The Higher Cost of Being African-American or 
Latino: Subprime Home Mortgage Lending in New York City 1 (2007).  A study of the 2005 
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act data for New York City found that nearly half (45.9%) of all HMDA 
loans to African-Americans were subprime—three times higher than the percentage of subprime loans 
to whites (16.6%); and, more than 40% of all home purchase loans to residents of minority neighbor-
hoods were subprime—more than six times higher than the percentage to residents of predominantly 
white neighborhoods (6.3%).  Id. at 3–4.  Clearly, the decline of redlining has not deterred discrimina-
tory lending practices; however, this should provide incentive for strengthening the CRA, rather than a 
reason for stripping it of its strength.
12. See Community Credit Needs: Hearings on S. 406 Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban 
Affairs, 95th Cong. 2 (1977) (opening statement of William Proxmire, Chairman, S. Comm. on 
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs); Marsico, supra note 4, at 12–13.
13. See generally Swire, supra note 2, at 791.  In discussing the disturbing ripple effect of discrimination 
through disparate treatment in lending opportunities, Swire states that
  statistical discrimination can persist over time.  If the practice is profit-maximizing, new 
lenders will not be able to enter and eliminate the race-based practice.  A second way for 
discrimination to persist is if the disadvantaged group perceives the existence of 
discrimination, and therefore invests less in creditworthiness.  Borrowers who believe they 
will not receive fair access to credit in the future may rationally work less hard to pay 
current obligations—the perceived existence of discrimination can cause the borrower to 
have a lower expected value from efforts to maintain good credit.
 Id. (footnote omitted).
14. See 12 U.S.C. § 2901(b) (2006); Lee v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 118 F.3d 905, 913 (2d 
Cir. 1997).
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 (2) the convenience and needs of communities include the need for   
 credit services as well as deposit services; and
 (3) regulated financial institutions have a continuing and affirmative   
 obligation to help meet the credit needs of the local communities in which   
 they are chartered.15
Congress’s stated purpose in enacting the CRA was as follows:
 (b) It is the purpose of this chapter to require each appropriate Federal  
 financial supervisory agency to use its authority when examining financial  
 institutions, to encourage such institutions to help meet the credit needs  
 of the local communities in which they are chartered consistent with the  
 safe and sound operation of such institutions.16
 The regulations enforcing the statute’s purpose do not offer much additional 
clarity.17  Although commentators generally agree that there is a need for community 
reinvestment regulation to deter the exporting of capital out of low-income 
communities,18 few people agree on the best way to implement such regulation.19 
The most ardent opponents of the CRA argue that any attempt to regulate a bank’s 
lending within particular communities is tantamount to credit allocation (e.g., 
lending quotas or lending affirmative action), which undermines the free market and 
dangerously imposes on the safe and sound lending practices upon which the banking 
industry rests.20
15. 12 U.S.C. § 2901 (2006) (emphasis added).
16. Id. § 2901(b) (emphasis added).
17. See Lee, 118 F.3d at 913 (“[A]ny attempt to glean substance from the CRA is met with the reality that 
the statute sets no standards for the evaluation of a bank’s contribution to the needs of its community.”) 
(citation omitted); A. Brooke Overby, The Community Reinvestment Act Reconsidered, 143 U. Pa. L. Rev. 
1431, 1431 (1995) (explaining that the CRA “has been the focus of intense criticism within the financial 
community” and that regulators have yet to implement it properly).
18. See, e.g., Marsico, supra note 4, at 173 (noting that the CRA was enacted to stop the practice of 
redlining and to increase bank lending in low- and moderate-income communities).
19. Overby, supra note 17, at 1435.
20. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Community Reinvestment Act: An Economic 
Analysis, 79 Va. L. Rev. 291, 295 (1993).  The authors argue:
  The CRA impairs the safety and soundness of an already overstrained banking industry: it 
promotes the concentration of assets in geographically nondiversified locations, encourages 
banks to make unprofitable and risky investment and product-line decisions, and penalizes 
banks that seek to reduce costs by consolidating services or closing or relocating branches. 
The statute, moreover, imposes a significant tax on bank mergers and deters transactions 
that would otherwise improve the efficiency and solvency of the nation’s banking system.
 Id.  But see Marsico, supra note 4, at 173–74.  Marsico responds that:
  Congress intended the CRA to inf luence lenders to make more loans in redlined 
neighborhoods but not to allocate credit. . . . The CRA does not establish loan quotas or 
mandatory penalties for failure to comply. . . . [R]elevant data is consistent with the 
conclusion that the CRA has inf luenced banks to lend hundreds of billions of dollars to 
LMI and other underserved neighborhoods . . . .
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 The CRA authorizes four federal regulatory agencies to oversee the community 
reinvestment practices of banking institutions.  These agencies include: the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System (“FRB”), the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (“FDIC”), the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”), and 
the Office of Thrift Supervision (“OTS”).21
 Each of these four federal agencies is required to conduct periodic CRA perfor-
mance evaluations of the banks it regulates.22  The purpose of these evaluations is to 
gather data, largely through the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (“HMDA”), which 
tracks the number, type, and interest rate of bank loans, as well as loan applicant and 
neighborhood characteristics (e.g., ethnicity, race, and income).23  This data is col-
lected by the Federal Reserve and included in a publicly available CRA performance 
evaluation that is prepared by the bank’s regulatory agency.24  These evaluations rate 
the bank as: “Outstanding,” “Satisfactory,” “Needs to improve,” or “Substantial non-
Compliance.”25  An important factor in determining a bank’s record of meeting 
community credit needs is whether, and to what extent, the bank participates in sub-
prime and other potentially predatory lending practices.26
     Id.
21. 12 U.S.C. § 2902 (2006).  The OCC regulates national banks; the FRB regulates state chartered banks 
that are members of the Federal Reserve System and bank holding companies; the FDIC regulates state 
chartered banks and savings banks that are not members of the Federal Reserve System and the deposits 
of which are insured by the FDIC; and the OTS regulates savings associations, the deposits of which 
are insured by the FDIC, and savings and loan holding companies.  Id.
22. Id. § 2903.
23. 12 C.F.R. § 203.4 (2008) (also known as “Regulation C”).  These reporting requirements outlined in 
the Code of Federal Regulations are authorized by the HMDA.  12 U.S.C. § 2801 (2006).  The purpose 
of HMDA is to provide the public with loan data:
  (i) To help determine whether financial institutions are serving the housing needs of their 
communities; (ii) To assist public officials in distributing public-sector investment so as to 
attract private investment to areas where it is needed; and (iii) To assist in identifying 
possible discriminatory lending patterns and enforcing antidiscrimination statutes.
 12 C.F.R. § 203.1 (2008).
24. 12 U.S.C. § 2906 (2006).  The written evaluation may also have a confidential section, which can 
include named customers, employees, or officers, and statements that are “too sensitive” to disclose to 
the public.  Id. § 2906(c).
25. Id. § 2906(b)(2).
26. See generally Roberto G. Quercia, Michael A. Stegman & Walter R. Davis, Ctr. for Cmty. 
Capitalism, Kenan Inst. for Private Enter., The Impact of Predatory Loan Terms on 
Subprime Foreclosures: The Special Case of Prepayment Penalties and Balloon Payments 
2, 4–5 (2005) (explaining the devastating effects of subprime lending in communities; noting that in the 
fourth quarter of 2003, more than one in twenty subprime borrowers was at risk of foreclosure, but only 
one in one hundred prime borrowers faced the same risk); Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, 
Turning a Blind Eye: Wall Street Finance of Predatory Lending, 75 Fordham L. Rev. 2039, 2040 (2007) 
(noting the concern that securitization facilitates predatory lending and that most subprime loans are 
securitized, yet little has been done to address this problem at the secondary market level).  Studies 
continue to show that subprime home mortgage loans lead to higher rates of foreclosure, and often these 
foreclosures wipe out entire blocks and neighborhoods.  Therefore, the logical conclusion is that sub-
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 In addition, the agency will examine a bank’s community economic development 
practices each time the bank files a merger or expansion application with the agency.27 
Again, the agency conducts a review of the bank’s lending practices and past CRA 
performance evaluations, and allows the community to make public comments re-
garding the bank’s community economic development history.28  The public comment 
period is important for community advocates because it is the only recourse available 
to communities under the CRA.  The CRA does not grant individuals any civil right 
of action against a bank that is not meeting the community’s credit needs.29  After 
taking into account its own review of a bank and any public comments on a bank’s 
CRA activities, the agency may determine that the bank has not met the communi-
ty’s credit needs, in which case the agency may reject or delay the bank’s merger/
expansion plans.30  Thus, access to a bank’s lending and investment information is 
critical for community advocates wishing to publicly comment on a merger/expan-
sion plan.
 In the course of turning over information to the appropriate regulatory agencies, 
either for standard CRA performance evaluations or for merger/expansion applica-
tions, banks may request that some items remain confidential.31  Banks do so for 
obvious reasons—some of the information may be proprietary information or trade 
secrets, and some of the information might be damaging for the bank’s public rela-
tions (for example, if evidence of predatory lending patterns is apparent).  Herein lies 
the tension between the CRA, which requires public disclosure of certain bank 
lending practices affecting the community,32 and FOIA Exemption 4, which, in 
prime lending, intensified by securitization, has caused a large loss of capital in many communities, 
which is precisely the kind of activity the CRA was designed to monitor.
27. 12 C.F.R. § 228.29(a)(1)(ii) (2008).
28. Id. §§ 228.29(b), 228.43(a)(1).
29. See 12 U.S.C. § 2906(a)–(b) (2006) (requiring the federal financial supervisory agencies to prepare 
written evaluations of banks’ CRA performance and make this report available to the public).  See 
generally E. L. Baldinucci, The Community Reinvestment Act: New Standards Provide New Hope, 23 
Fordham Urb. L.J. 831, 838 (1996) (referencing the three main purposes of the CRA regulations: “[1.] 
community delineation, [2.] disclosure, and [3.] compliance”); Scott L. Cummings, Community Economic 
Development As Progressive Politics: Toward a Grassroots Movement for Economic Justice, 54 Stan. L. Rev. 
399, 441 n.212 (2001) (noting the inf luence of the CRA in “harness[ing] market forces” to empower 
communities to hold banks accountable to the citizens in the communities they serve); Gary M. Swidler, 
Making the Community Reinvestment Act Work, 69 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 387, 396–97 (1994) (noting the 1989 
congressional amendments to the CRA, which require “that banks disclose publicly regulators’ written 
evaluations of their CRA performance”).
30. 12 C.F.R. § 228.29(c) (2008) (“A bank’s record of performance may be the basis for denying or condi-
tioning approval of an application . . . .”); see also Baldinucci, supra note 29, at 841 (noting that community 
based organizations “[have taken] the lead in using the CRA to improve bank services . . . by raising 
challenges to bank applications with the regulatory agencies on the grounds that banks have not satis-
fied their CRA obligations”).
31. See 12 U.S.C. § 2906(c) (2006) (“The confidential section shall also contain any statements obtained 
. . . by the appropriate Federal financial supervisory agency . . . which, in the judgment of the agency, 
are too sensitive . . . to disclose to . . . the public.”).
32. See id. § 2906(b).
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part, provides a narrow exemption from public disclosure of the information if such 
disclosure would impair the regulatory agency’s ability to get information from a 
bank in the future.33
 Community advocates wishing to make public comments regarding a bank’s 
lending practices may seek disclosure of the bank’s relationship with subprime 
lenders, the bank’s history of purchasing bundles of subprime mortgages on the sec-
ondary markets (a.k.a. mortgage-backed securities), and other transactions affecting 
borrowers in the community.34  Despite the clear relevance of this information to a 
bank’s CRA performance history, obtaining access to this information can be quite 
difficult for several reasons.  Banks do not necessarily want to disclose their active 
involvement in the subprime market, as seen by the litigation that ensued in Inner 
City Press.  Additionally, the subprime market involves so many actors that tracing 
certain transactions back to a particular bank may be quite difficult and cost-prohib-
itive for community economic development advocates.35
 The CRA has been criticized as an “amorphous statute” that provides little di-
rection for courts or agencies charged with CRA oversight.36  The Act’s major frailty 
lies in the fact that it does not enunciate clear standards by which to measure a 
bank’s performance in meeting community credit needs.37  To make matters worse, 
the federal regulatory agencies may rely on this lack of specificity to demand as little 
as possible from the banks they evaluate—to avoid conflict with the banks and main-
tain cordial relationships with them.38  However, community advocates cannot 
33. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (2006) (stating that matters exempt from disclosure include “trade secrets and 
commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential”).
34. See generally Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and Economics of 
Predatory Lending, 80 Tex. L. Rev. 1255, 1364–65 (2002) (listing the predatory lending practices that 
should bar banking entities from receiving CRA credit).
35. See generally Subprime Mortgage Market Turmoil: Examining the Role of Securitization: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Securities, Insurance, and Investments of the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 
110th Cong. 20 (2007) [hereinafter Subprime Mortgage Hearing] (statement of Christopher L. Peterson, 
Associate Professor of Law, University of Florida) (arguing that “the opacity of securitization deals 
makes successful consumer enforcement of their rights cost prohibitive”).
36. See Inner City Press, 463 F.3d at 246 n.7 (quoting Lee, 118 F.3d at 913).
37. See Lee, 118 F.3d at 913 (“[A]ny attempt to glean substance from the CRA is met with the reality that 
the statute sets no standards for the evaluation of a bank’s contribution to the needs of its community.”) 
(citation omitted).
38. Thus, it seems apparent that regulatory agencies are consistently conflicted over their role in how far to 
go to regulate industries.  This issue was recently litigated by the Environmental Protection Agency in 
Massachusetts v. EPA.  See 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007).  The EPA unsuccessfully argued that the Clean Air 
Act did not give the agency the authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions.  Id. at 1446.  The Court 
found that although Congress may not have “appreciated the possibility that burning fossil fuels could 
lead to global warming, they did understand that without regulatory f lexibility, changing circumstances 
and scientific developments would soon render the Clean Air Act obsolete.”  Id. at 1462.  By analogy, 
one could argue that although Congress did not foresee the impact of the securitization of subprime 
loans on community economic development, the CRA would be rendered obsolete if it did not require 
disclosures pertaining to new, predatory developments in the financial industry.  The CRA may have 
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effectively evaluate a bank’s lending practices if pertinent information is not publicly 
available.
III. THE SECURITIZATION OF SUBPRIME LOANS
 Securitization is simply the process of converting illiquid assets into liquid ones. 
For example, in the mortgage industry, a loan originator may pool several mortgages 
together and sell that bundle of loans to convert the mortgages into cash.  A common 
method that developed to churn more of these mortgages into cash for investors 
takes this a step further: the purchaser of the bundle of loans transfers that asset pool 
to a subsidiary, the subsidiary offers the assets to another entity (often a trust), which 
then becomes the issuer, and the issuer then uses an investment bank to repackage 
the assets into securities that can be priced and sold to investors in the secondary 
market.39  This process of securitization also allows the secondary market to invest at 
relatively low risk, because the securitized mortgages have been many times removed 
from the originator.  In other words, each time the assets (the pool of mortgages) are 
transferred to a new entity, they become increasingly sheltered from creditors in the 
event that the original lender goes bankrupt.40
 Securitization is a common tool in the world of structured finance;41 however, it 
becomes dangerous when applied to subprime loans, because it allows investors in 
the secondary market to “insulate themselves from the risks of predatory lending 
without having to monitor loan originations.”42  This insulation is likely one of the 
primary reasons for the high demand, and eventual collapse, of the subprime lending 
market.43
effectively ended red-lining; however, new forms of discriminatory and predatory lending are constantly 
developing and should be addressed by the CRA.
39. For a more detailed explanation of the securitization of mortgages, see Subprime Mortgage Hearing, supra 
note 35, at 4 fig. A (providing a graphical display of the subprime home mortgage securitization 
structure).
40. Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, Predatory Lending: What Does Wall Street Have to Do with It?, 
15 Housing Pol’y Debate 715, 717 (2004).
41. See generally Engel & McCoy, supra note 34, at 1273 (explaining the development of the “securitization 
movement” in the 1970s and 1980s, and noting that, “by 1993, sixty percent of home mortgage loans 
were securitized”).
42. Engel & McCoy, supra note 40, at 716.
43. See id. (arguing that market discipline by the capital markets is not sufficient to stop predatory lending 
and that the lack of incentives for the market to curb predatory lending is a dangerous model); Subprime 
Mortgage Hearing, supra note 35, at 13 (noting that “[b]ecause securitization allows an originator to 
quickly resell its loans, the originator can make many loans while exposing only minimal assets to liabil-
ity”).  Moreover, “because the securitization conduit divides various lending tasks into multiple corporate 
entities—a broker, an originator, a servicer, a document custodian, etc.—the conduit tends to prevent 
the accumulation of a large enough pool of at risk assets to attract the attention of class action attor-
neys.” Subprime Mortgage Hearing, supra note 35, at 14; Kara Scannell & Deborah Solomon, Unraveling 
the Subprime Mess, Wall St. J., Sept. 4, 2007, at A6 (quoting the Treasury’s Assistant Secretary for 
Economic Policy, Phillip Swagel, who stated that “he expects the landscape for ratings concerns to 
change as Wall Street and Washington digest the lessons of the past few months.  ‘There will probably 
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 Securitization of home mortgages by the private sector, which did not start until 
the 1980s, was likely not on Congress’s radar when the CRA was passed, and the 
practice was not explicitly addressed by the CRA.44  Therefore, federal regulatory 
agencies assert that they have no authority under the CRA to require banks to dis-
close their investments in the secondary market of subprime mortgages.45  The 
Second Circuit appears to agree with this argument, however inconsistent it may 
be.46  Advocates are thus left with three options: wait for the legislature to address 
the problem; wait for continued litigation that may or may not follow current prece-
dent; or, seek alternative means to obtain this valuable information.
 To combat this void of information, community advocates have chosen to use 
alternative means.  Specifically, they have used FOIA requests to extract more infor-
mation about a bank’s lending and investment practices.47  Disclosures made pursuant 
to FOIA are much more expansive than the CRA performance evaluations pub-
lished by the regulatory agencies, and FOIA allows any individual to request 
disclosure of non-confidential or proprietary information from any federal regulatory 
agency.48  FOIA requests can therefore be a powerful tool for community economic 
development advocates.  However, developments in FOIA case law in New York and 
the District of Columbia have effectively closed the door on FOIA requests for cer-
tain information pertinent to determining a bank’s CRA performance.49
 From a community advocate’s perspective, the participation of local and national 
banks in the subprime mortgage investment pool may be a critical factor in deter-
mining a bank’s commitment (or lack thereof) to a particular community’s economic 
development.  Understanding the role of banks in the subprime loan securitization 
process helps to set the stage for the argument that the nature and extent of a bank’s 
investments in subprime loan portfolios should be considered a key factor in the 
CRA evaluation process and therefore made available through public FOIA re-
quests.50
be a lot more scrutiny, in a sense, a lot more analysis being done of the underlying credit.  And that’s 
probably a good thing.’”).
44. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 26, at 2045 (noting that private sector mortgage securitization did not 
start until the 1970s).
45. See, e.g., Inner City Press, 463 F.3d at 246 n.7.
46. See id.
47. See Rainey, infra note 58, at 1431.
48. See Herbert N. Foerstel, Freedom of Information and the Right to Know: The Origins and 
Applications of the Freedom of Information Act 44 (1999) (“Despite its many inadequacies, 
America’s FOIA is recognized world-wide as trailblazing legislation.  It established for the first time the 
statutory right of any person to access government information.”).
49. See Inner City Press, 463 F.3d at 248; Critical Mass, 975 F.2d at 880.
50. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 34, at 1364–65 (arguing that banks should not be allowed to receive 
CRA credit for predatory loans and that banks that purchase bundled subprime loans on the secondary 
market should not receive CRA credit unless they can show that they have adequately investigated the 
originator’s lending practices to ensure that they are non-discriminatory and non-predatory).
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IV. THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT: A VALUABLE TOOL FOR CRA 
ADVOCATES
[T]he [Freedom of Information Act] repeatedly states “that official information 
shall be made available ‘to the public,’ ‘ for public inspection.’” There are, however, 
exemptions from compelled disclosure. . . . But these limited exemptions do not 
obscure the basic policy that disclosure, not secrecy, is the dominant objective of the 
Act.51
 The Freedom of Information Act was passed in 1966—a tumultuous time in 
American history.52  The military was in the thick of the Vietnam War, and the 
American government was fighting a fierce sociopolitical war against Communism. 
Just a few years prior to the enactment of FOIA, President John F. Kennedy was 
calling for the press to censor itself in the name of national security, stating that 
“[t]he danger has never been more clear and its presence has never been more immi-
nent.  It requires a change in outlook, a change in tactics, a change in missions—by 
the Government, by the people, by every business man, union leader and newspaper.”53 
The Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation were also 
in their heyday—mining secret intelligence information and combating Communist 
uprisings.  Secrets were rampant, and the unavailability of relevant information 
would lead to a crescendo of extreme public disillusionment guided by a disgruntled 
and hostile press.54  Demonstrating this sentiment, Senator Edward V. Long quoted 
James Madison in a 1965 Senate Report supporting the enactment of FOIA, stating 
that “[k]nowledge will forever govern ignorance, and a people who mean to be their 
own governors, must arm themselves with the power knowledge gives.  A popular 
government without popular information or the means of acquiring it, is but a pro-
logue to a farce or a tragedy or perhaps both.”55  On the eve of FOIA’s passage, 
Donald Rumsfeld, then a young congressman from Illinois, reportedly called FOIA 
the most important piece of federal legislation in decades.56  Understanding the can-
51. Dep’t of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976) (citation omitted).
52. It should be noted that FOIA was passed eleven years prior to the CRA—thus, many types of financial 
information that may now be included in CRA evaluations and merger applications could have been 
sought by community advocates through FOIA requests long before the CRA actually existed.
53. Russell Porter, President Urges Press Limit News That Helps Reds, N.Y. Times, Apr. 28, 1961, at 1 (noting 
that President Kennedy was urging the press to “accept the need for greater governmental secrecy on all 
matters affecting national security” and to demonstrate more “self-restraint” and “self-discipline” due to 
the Cold War and the threat of Communism).
54. See Foerstel, supra note 48, at 39 (“[In 1963,] [j]ust weeks before President Kennedy’s untimely death, 
Sigma Delta Chi, the professional journalistic fraternity, stated in the New York Times that freedom of 
information was at ‘the lowest ebb in history’ because of the ‘blanket of secrecy over the records of 
government.’”) (footnote omitted).
55. S. Rep. No. 89-813, at 2–3 (1965).
56. Editorial, We Have a Right to Know, Dallas Times Herald, June 16, 1966, at B17 (quoting Rep. 
Rumsfeld as stating that FOIA would address “a particular communications problem: government 
becoming so complex that it is difficult for the public to stay informed.  When Government secrecy 
enters this picture, staying informed becomes impossible”); see also Charles Nicodemus, House Shoo-In: 
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vass upon which FOIA was painted helps to highlight the policy concerns behind its 
statutory presumption in favor of disclosure.
 Today, the same concerns that prompted the enactment of FOIA have been reit-
erated by the 110th Congress:
[T]he American people believe that . . . our constitutional democracy, our 
system of self-government, and our commitment to popular sovereignty 
depends upon the consent of the governed; . . . such consent is not meaning-
ful unless it is informed consent; . . . as Justice Black noted[,] . . . ‘The 
effective functioning of a free government like ours depends largely on the 
force of an informed public opinion.  This calls for the widest possible under-
standing of the quality of government service rendered by all elective or 
appointed public officials or employees.’57
 The central purpose of FOIA is to open agency doors to public inquiry.58 
Congress intended that FOIA maintain a presumption favoring disclosure, unless 
the information sought falls under one of the Act’s specified nine exemptions.59  This 
presumption effectively enabled community advocate groups like Inner City Press 
‘Freedom of Information’ Bill, Chicago Daily News, 1966.  The author quotes Rep. Rumsfeld explain-
ing the need for the passage of FOIA:
  The unanimous action after years of delay results from the growing size and complexity of 
the federal government, from its increased role in our lives, and from the increasing 
awareness by Americans of the threat involved in government secrecy on vital records 
effecting their fate. . . . [W]ith the continuing tendency toward managed news and 
suppression of public information that the people are entitled to have, the issues have at last 
been brought home forcefully to the public.
 Id.
57. Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 2007, H.R. 1309, 110th Cong. § 2(1)(A)–(C) (2007) 
(citation omitted).
58. See Richard L. Rainey, Stare Decisis and Statutory Interpretation: An Argument for a Complete Overruling 
of the National Parks Test, 61 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1430, 1431 (1993); see also S. Rep. No. 89-813, at 38 
(1965) (noting that the enormity of the U.S. government and its hundreds of agencies, departments, and 
branches militates in favor of having an “information policy of full disclosure”).  The 1965 Senate 
Report concluded by stating:
  The committee feels that this bill, as amended, would establish a much-needed policy of 
disclosure, while balancing the necessary interests of confidentiality. A government by 
secrecy benefits no one. It injures the people it seeks to serve; it injures its own integrity 
and operation. It breeds mistrust, dampens the fervor of its citizens, and mocks their loy-
alty.
 S. Rep. No. 89-813, at 45.
59. See John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 493 U.S. 146, 152 (1989) (citing Rose, 425 U.S. at 361; 5 
U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (2006)) (“[E]xemptions [from disclosure set forth in FOIA] ‘must be narrowly 
construed’ [and] ‘the burden is on the agency to sustain its action.’”); NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber 
Co., 437 U.S. 214, 221 (1978) (“[U]nless requested material falls within one of these nine statutory 
exemptions, FOIA requires that records . . . be made available . . . .”); cf. Gould v. N.Y. City Police 
Dep’t, 89 N.Y.2d 267 (1996) (“All government records are . . . presumptively open for public inspection 
and copying unless they fall within [an] enumerated exemption of [Freedom of Information Law].”); 
Capital Newspapers v. Whalen, 69 N.Y.2d 246 (1987); Rainey, supra note 58, at 1431.
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(“ICP”) to use FOIA requests to obtain information collected by regulatory agencies 
that was not disclosed in a bank’s publicly available CRA performance evaluation.60
 Disclosure has its limits, however, and Congress explicitly recognized this in 
enacting the nine exemptions to FOIA requests.61  This note will focus only on fed-
eral regulatory agencies’ use of FOIA Exemption 4 to avoid disclosure of bank 
subprime lending investments and activities.  Exemption 4 is known as the “com-
mercial or financial information exception,” and it contains three major elements that 
the government must prove in order for the exemption to apply: the information 
must be (1) commercial or financial, (2) obtained from a person, and (3) privileged or 
confidential.62  The first two elements are straightforward, but the final element, 
“privileged or confidential,” has been subject to interpretation by the courts because 
it is not defined in the statute.  Case law, primarily in the District of Columbia 
Circuit Court of Appeals, has developed around this issue, leading to the so-called 
National Parks test.63  The discussion of case law that follows will shed further light 
on the application of Exemption 4.
V. CASE LAW AND THE CRITICAL MASS RULE
 Exemption 4 litigation primarily focuses on whether the information sought is 
“privileged or confidential.”64  Eight years after the passage of FOIA, the D.C. 
Circuit formulated a foundational rule to help courts decide this issue.65  Now known 
as the National Parks test, the rule has two prongs and the government must satisfy 
at least one prong to gain the exemption from disclosure.  Information will be deemed 
“confidential” under Exemption 4 if it would be likely to: (1) “impair the govern-
ment’s ability to obtain necessary information in the future; or (2) cause substantial 
harm to the competitive position of the person from whom the information was 
obtained.”66
 The rationale behind the “impairment” prong is that business organizations 
might withhold certain necessary information from regulatory agencies unless they 
60. Inner City Press is a non-profit organization that conducts investigations and initiates litigation 
surrounding community economic development and lending discrimination.  ICP has used FOIA 
requests to obtain bank lending information, but its attempts have been denied by the regulatory 
agencies and the Second Circuit has upheld these denials.  See, e.g., Inner City Press, 463 F.3d 239.
61. See Stephen Gidiere & Jason Forrester, Balancing Homeland Security and Freedom of Information, 16 Nat. 
Resources & Env’t 139 (2002) (noting that FOIA “balances public disclosure against other important 
considerations,” such as national security in the post-September 11 context).
62. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (2006); Nat’l Parks & Conservation Ass’n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 766 (D.C. Cir. 
1974).
63. See Nat’ l Parks, 498 F.2d 765.  Since FOIA requests apply to governmental regulatory agencies, the 
requests are most-often directed at agencies located in Washington, D.C.  Therefore, the D.C. Circuit 
is recognized as the leading authority on FOIA law and its decisions are routinely adopted in a majority 
of jurisdictions when hearing the occasional FOIA case.
64. See, e.g., id.
65. See id.
66. Id. at 770.
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are certain that the information will not be disclosed to the public.67  The National 
Parks test is founded on the assumption that if business information turned over to a 
regulatory agency is compelled by that agency, there is “no danger that public disclo-
sure will impair the ability of the Government to obtain the information in the 
future.”  Thus, information that is compelled is in no need of protection under 
Exemption 4.  By contrast, in the case of voluntarily submitted business information, 
the government’s interest is in ensuring the continued availability of such informa-
tion, and therefore in such a case the government is required to demonstrate that this 
interest would be impaired if disclosure were required.
 The National Parks test ostensibly protects the government’s ability to obtain in-
formation from the organizations it regulates by “encouraging cooperation” in 
assuring those organizations that the information they provide will remain confiden-
tial.68  In other words, certain confidential information will be exempted from the 
disclosure requirements of FOIA in order to preserve congenial relations between 
government agencies and the organizations they regulate.
 The National Parks test survived eighteen years as the lead decision interpreting 
Exemption 4, and it represents a careful balancing approach between the public’s 
right to access information and the need for government agencies to protect informa-
tion that would not generally be available to the public.69  But in 1992, the D.C. 
Circuit substantially altered the National Parks test in Critical Mass Energy Project v. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission.70
 The Critical Mass decision confined the National Parks test to situations in which 
organizations are required to provide information to regulatory agencies.  Thus, where 
“the information sought is given to the Government voluntarily, it will be treated as 
confidential under Exemption 4 if it is of a kind that the provider would not custom-
arily make available to the public.”71  Critical Mass effectively eliminated the 
presumption in favor of disclosure of all information voluntarily provided to a regula-
tory agency.
 Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, then a D.C. Circuit Judge, authored a prophetic 
dissent to the Critical Mass opinion, joined by the Chief Judge and Circuit Judges 
Wald and Edwards.  The dissent argued that the new rule issued by the Critical Mass 
majority was a break from National Parks precedent and was not in line with the 
legislative purpose of FOIA.72
67. The opinion argues a slippery slope theory that organizations “may decline to cooperate with officials 
and the ability of the Government to make intelligent, well informed decisions will be impaired.”  Id. at 
767.
68. Id. at 768.
69. See id. at 766–67.
70. 975 F.2d 871.
71. Id. at 872.
72. Id. at 882 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  Judge Ginsburg contended:
  Stare decisis, though protractedly addressed, has not been appropriately observed in today’s 
decision.  Nor has the guiding purpose of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)—to 
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 Critical Mass dealt with a FOIA request for safety reports prepared by the 
Institute for Nuclear Power Operations and voluntarily submitted to the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission on the condition of confidentiality.73  Judge Buckley, writing 
for the majority, believed that the case presented an opportunity to amend the 
National Parks test and create a “categorical” exemption for information voluntarily 
provided to regulators.74  The majority argued that this new test, automatically ex-
empting voluntarily provided information, was objective and that “no case considered 
by this court in the past . . . would have been decided differently had this test been 
applied.”75  At the time, the majority may have been correct.  However, this back-
ward-looking view was narrow-minded, as expressed by Judge Ginsburg’s dissent, 
which noted that “we have had rather few cases concerning voluntarily submitted 
information.”76  Thus, the court failed to foresee the harm this decision could cause 
in future cases involving voluntary submissions.
 Today, the dispute regarding FOIA requests for bank information voluntarily 
provided to regulatory agencies conducting CRA performance evaluations is pre-
cisely the type of scenario Judge Ginsburg foreshadowed.  The CRA’s lack of clarity 
regarding the type of information regulatory agencies must use to develop appro-
priate CRA performance evaluations leaves regulators with little option other than 
to accept whatever information the bank is willing to provide.  Therefore, the cate-
gorical exemption for voluntarily submitted information created by the Critical Mass 
decision could conceivably exclude most FOIA requests submitted to CRA regula-
tory agencies.
 Judge Ginsburg’s prediction that the Critical Mass rule was too far reaching in its 
attempt to “categorize” all voluntary disclosures has recently become a reality in Inner 
City Press.77  In Inner City Press, a community based organization, ICP, sought dis-
closure of certain information gathered by the FRB while conducting a CRA review 
for Wachovia’s merger application with SouthTrust.78  The FRB is required to ap-
prove all bank mergers under the Bank Holding Company Act (“BHCA”).79  Prior to 
submitting its merger application, Wachovia called the FRB to inquire whether it 
was required to provide information about its relationships with subprime lending 
clients (i.e., lenders that charge high loan interest rates—often associated with pred-
shed light on an agency’s performance of its statutory duties—been well served by the en 
banc disposition.  I therefore dissent from the court’s FOIA and precedent unsettling 
judgment and opinion.
 Id.
73. Id. at 874 (majority opinion).
74. Id. at 879.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 884 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
77. 463 F.3d 239.
78. Id. at 242.
79. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(a)(5) (2006).
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atory lending).80  The FRB answered that the information would be “helpful if public 
commentators question an applicant’s relationships with subprime lenders.”81 
Thereafter, Wachovia provided this information in the form of an attachment 
(“Exhibit Three”) to the application, but requested that it be kept confidential.82
 Once the FRB completed its evaluation of the merger application, ICP made a 
FOIA request for this information.83  As discussed in Part II of this note, commu-
nity groups like ICP often review bank merger applications because they are permitted 
to submit comments on bank mergers under the provisions of the CRA regulations 
promulgated by the FRB.84  The purpose of these public comments is to allow com-
munity groups to participate in the bank merger application process by highlighting 
banks that are not meeting the credit needs of their communities.85  Arguably, an 
even more important outcome of the public comment process is that it attracts com-
munity and media attention to banks using unscrupulous lending practices and 
incentivizes banks to take prophylactic measures to reduce the use of potentially dis-
criminatory lending practices.86
 Pursuant to ICP’s request, the FRB released portions of the merger application.87 
However, it withheld certain “confidential” documents, including Exhibit Three, 
which contained:
(i) the names of nine of Wachovia’s commercial customers that make and/or 
purchase subprime residential mortgage loans; (ii) the specific amounts and 
some terms of Wachovia’s credit facilities to these customers; (iii) descriptions 
of other banking services Wachovia provides to, or other relationships with, 
these customers; (iv) financial data on Wachovia’s exposure and loan 
outstandings to commercial customers who engage in subprime lending; and 
(v) details regarding the due diligence Wachovia performs in evaluating 
particular lenders’ requests for credit facilities.88
80. Inner City Press, 463 F.3d at 242.
81. Id.
82. Id.  More specifically, Exhibit Three contained the names of nine Wachovia clients that make and/or 
purchase subprime home mortgage loans; amounts and terms of the credit extended by Wachovia to 
these subprime lending clients; descriptions of the services Wachovia offers these subprime lending 
clients; Wachovia’s “due diligence” procedures used to manage its relationships with subprime lenders; 
and further financial data regarding Wachovia’s relationships with these subprime lending clients.  Id. 
at 242–43.
83. Id. at 243; see also 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006).
84. See 12 C.F.R. § 228.43 (2008).
85. Richard Marsico, A Guide to Enforcing the Community Reinvestment Act, 20 Fordham Urb. L.J. 165, 170 
(1993).
86. See Robert C. Art, Social Responsibility in Bank Credit Decisions: The Community Reinvestment Act One 
Decade Later, 18 Pac. L.J. 1071, 1075 (1987) (“The primary force for change has not been the agencies 
themselves, but rather community groups which have accrued important new leverage in negotiations 
with depository institutions.”); Marsico, supra note 85, at 171.
87. Inner City Press, 463 F.3d at 243.
88. Id. at 242–43.
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The FRB refused to release Exhibit Three, claiming that the information was ex-
empt from release under FOIA Exemption 4.89  However, this information may be 
crucial to a community group’s ability to accurately evaluate a bank’s CRA perfor-
mance in the community.90
 The district court held that parts (i), (ii), and (iii) of Exhibit Three were confi-
dential and not subject to disclosure.91  The court did not explicitly apply the Critical 
Mass rule in its decision, and the parties did not argue for its adoption; thus the 
Second Circuit noted that it would not adopt the Critical Mass rule sua sponte.92 
However, the district court’s decision was founded, in part, upon the fact that the 
bank voluntarily submitted the information to the regulatory authorities.93  “Because 
the district court found that Wachovia voluntarily rather than mandatorily submitted 
the names to the Board, the court did not find a presumption against impairment of 
the government’s ability to obtain information.”94  In essence, the district court used 
the reasoning of Critical Mass without citing Critical Mass for support.  And the 
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision while offering a thinly veiled invitation for 
future litigants to argue for the outright adoption of Critical Mass.95
 Ultimately, the Second Circuit reasoned that if Wachovia was not compelled by 
the FRB to submit the information about its subprime lending clients, then the sub-
mission of that information should be considered voluntary and should remain 
confidential.96  Therefore, the Inner City Press holding requires a plaintiff seeking 
CRA information under FOIA to prove that the regulatory agency asserted its au-
89. Exemption 4 is for “trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and 
privileged or confidential.”  5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (2006).  “[I]nformation is confidential for the purposes 
of Exemption 4 if its disclosure would have the effect either: 1) of impairing the government’s ability to 
obtain [necessary] information . . . in the future, or 2) of causing substantial harm to the competitive 
position of the person from whom the information was obtained.  Inner City Press, 463 F.3d at 244 
(citing Cont’l Stock Transfer & Trust Co. v. SEC, 566 F.2d 373, 375 (2d. Cir. 1977)).
90. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 40.  For example, certain subprime lenders may be under investigation 
by state and federal authorities, others may have actually been found guilty of violations of the Truth in 
Lending Act of 1968, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (2000).  If advocates cannot determine which subprime lenders 
have dealings with their banks, and the volume of these transactions that take place, then they cannot 
possibly make an accurate determination whether their bank is engaging in harmful activity in their 
community.
91. Inner City Press, 463 F.3d at 243.
92. Id. at 245 n.6.
93. Inner City Press/Cmty. on the Move v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 380 F. Supp. 2d 211, 
218 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
94. Inner City Press, 463 F.3d at 246.
95. Id. at 245.
96. Id. at 246–48.  The court noted divergent holdings on this “impairment” issue within the District 
Court of the District of Columbia.  Compare Parker v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 141 F. Supp. 2d 71, 78 
n.6 (D.D.C. 2001) (holding that “[i]n addition to possessing the authority to compel submission, the 
agency must also exercise that authority in order for a submission to be deemed mandatory”), with Teich 
v. FDA, 751 F. Supp. 243, 251 (D.D.C. 1990) (holding that “where compelled cooperation will obtain 
precisely the same results as voluntary cooperation, an impairment claim cannot be countenanced”).
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thority to compel disclosure before such information is deemed “mandatory” under 
the National Parks test.97  In essence, the court applied the Critical Mass rule, without 
expressly adopting it because the analysis stopped once the court determined that the 
information was submitted voluntarily.  The essence of Critical Mass is that it creates 
a categorical exemption for voluntarily submitted information—eliminating an advo-
cate’s ability to argue that, although the information was voluntarily provided, it 
should nonetheless be disclosed for reasons x, y, and z.  Thus, in Inner City Press, the 
court applied the Critical Mass rule because it did not conduct any analysis regarding 
the nature of the information sought.  Instead, the court determined that the infor-
mation was voluntarily provided and therefore categorically exempt.
VI. THE INTERSECTION OF CRITICAL MASS AND THE CRA
 Application of the Critical Mass rule in the context of FOIA requests for CRA 
information dramatically increases the burden on CRA advocates by requiring them 
to prove that banks were compelled to disclose information pursuant to a directive by 
a regulatory agency.  This increased burden may make it impossible for advocates to 
obtain the information they seek.  The CRA does not explicitly detail every piece of 
information that regulators may compel banks to submit when conducting perfor-
mance evaluations and reviewing merger applications—which will undoubtedly make 
it difficult for advocates to prove that the information they seek was a compelled 
disclosure.98  In addition, new lending and investment products are constantly 
evolving in the banking industry, making it unrealistic for Congress to maintain a 
list of compelled disclosures.
 Under the Critical Mass rule, statutes like the CRA, which do not enumerate 
precisely what information the regulatory agency may compel to be disclosed, are 
eviscerated of what little power they have to induce accountability in the banking 
industry.  The artificial voluntary-versus-compelled Critical Mass analysis will allow 
these regulatory agencies to simply avoid the risk of future litigation by never as-
serting any authority to compel information.99  This path-of-least-resistance will 
clearly promote stronger relationships between banks and their regulators, but will 
do so to the detriment of communities seeking their rightful access to information 
regarding the community economic development practices of their banks.100
97. Inner City Press, 463 F.3d at 247–48.
98. See generally Marsico, supra note 4, at 113–20 (noting that the CRA compliance manuals used by the 
regulatory agencies do “not require examiners to use a fixed set of evaluative criteria composed of 
quantitative measures of bank lending, quantitative benchmarks of community credit needs, and 
objective terms for evaluating bank lending” and that “[t]he standards for evaluating bank lending are 
subjective”).
99. See Reply Brief of Appellant at 9, Inner City Press v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 463 
F.3d 239 (2d Cir. 2006) (No. 05-6162).
100. See Critical Mass, 975 F.2d at 885 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  Judge Ginsburg warned:
  Henceforth, in this circuit, it will do for an agency official to agree with the submitter’s 
ascription of confidential status to the information.  There will be no objective check on, 
no judicial review alert to, “the temptation of government and business officials to follow 
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 In Inner City Press, the information that was found to be confidential—the credit 
terms, relationships, and number of investments maintained by Wachovia with com-
mercial customers that make and/or purchase subprime residential mortgage loans—is 
precisely the type of information that advocates must have in order to comment on a 
bank’s community economic development activities.101  Asking regulators and com-
munities to assess a bank’s community reinvestment practices without this information 
is like asking a building inspector to merely review the exterior of a home—there 
may be a fresh coat of paint and a f lower box in the window, but there may also be a 
f lood in the basement, termites in the foundation, and no insulation.  In other words, 
a bank may have loans and investments that count toward its community reinvest-
ment rating, but if it also has a portfolio of investments in subprime loans that is ten, 
twenty, or one hundred times the size of its community reinvestment loan portfolio, 
can regulators truly determine that this bank has a satisfactory CRA rating?102  Can 
community advocates accurately understand the bank’s activities in their neighbor-
hood?
 A far more practical approach was in place under the National Parks test, which 
required the court to address two fundamental questions: would the government be 
impaired by disclosure of the information, and would the entity be at a competitive 
disadvantage if the information were made public?  If the answer to either of these 
questions is no, then it should not matter whether the entity volunteered the infor-
mation or was compelled to disclose the information.103  Furthermore, the Critical 
Mass rule is not in line with the reasoning behind FOIA and the National Parks two-
part test interpreting Exemption 4.104  In the context of the CRA, the Critical Mass 
rule is not the perfect “one size fits all” standard that the D.C. Circuit believed it to 
be.
 The National Parks test incorporates the careful balancing of interests that 
Congress had in mind when drafting FOIA.  This balancing test compares the 
agency’s interest in obtaining future information from the organizations it regulates 
with the requestor’s asserted right to the disclosure of the information.  Such a bal-
ancing test requires courts to undergo a more searching review of the statutory basis 
for the requestor’s claim, and to conduct statutory interpretation to determine whether 
the governmental agency has the legal authority to compel the information—regard-
less of whether it was “voluntarily” submitted.  Moreover, the agency’s authority to 
compel the information sought should be the primary issue that determines whether 
the path of least resistance and say ‘confidential ’ whenever they seek to satisfy the 
government’s vast information needs.”
 Id. (citation omitted).
101. Inner City Press, 463 F.3d at 243.
102. See Brief for Defendant-Appellee at 6 n.2, Inner City Press v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 
463 F.3d 239 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting that while Wachovia “does not originate subprime loans, [it] 
provides credit facilities to commercial customers engaged in subprime lending”).
103. See Critical Mass, 975 F.2d at 884 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 882.
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Exemption 4 applies, and evidence that the agency actually asserted this authority 
should be irrelevant.  Such a test would be more congruent with the purposes of 
FOIA and the CRA.
VII. CONCLUSION
 In Critical Mass, Circuit Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote a prophetic dissent in 
which she questioned the D.C. Circuit’s decision to modify the National Parks test.105 
One of her strongest arguments against this new distinction between voluntary and 
mandatory disclosures was that it would encourage regulatory agencies to seek the 
path of least resistance by only accepting voluntary submissions of business informa-
tion from organizations, effectively placing all business information under this new 
protected category of confidential information.106  This is precisely the scenario that 
was before the court in Inner City Press.  The Critical Mass rule, as applied to FOIA 
requests for CRA information, removes vital checks and balances from the system 
and encourages a further diminution of community advocates’ rights against preda-
tory lenders.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 884 (“Thus the court’s new exemption 4 test, devised for voluntary submissions, is all the more 
difficult to reconcile with Congress’ unmistakably clear direction: ‘The mandate of the FOIA calls for 
broad disclosure of Government records,’ and ‘for this reason FOIA exemptions are to be narrowly 
construed.’”) (citations and punctuation omitted).
